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SUBJECT: SYG BAN VENTS DARFUR FRUSTRATION

REF: (A) MCBRIDE-DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 30 E-MAIL

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 b/d.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told the Security Council's Perm 5 that he has become "personally angry" with Sudanese President Bashir for lack of cooperation on UNAMID force generation and for lack of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Urging the P-5, collectively and individually, to carry word of his anger to Bashir, Ban pointedly confronted the Chinese representative, saying "I think China should do something more." The Chinese DPR replied that big-power pressure on Bashir would be counterproductive and that China therefore would continue to avoid criticizing Khartoum. Ambassador Khalilzad, joined by the UK and French representatives, argued that Bashir's behavior shows a lack of interest in deploying a competent force in Darfur. Ban closed by urging the P-5 and the full Security Council to do more to mobilize military resources for UNAMID, particularly helicopters, and to engage Khartoum more constructively, both by pushing African leaders to influence Bashir and by directly engaging Bashir themselves. A UN-led military team leaves today to inspect troops pledged for Darfur and expects to find that some African units are not up to standard at present, a circumstance that could further complicate relations with Khartoum. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) Following-up on a personal appeal from UN SYG Ban Ki-moon regarding Khartoum's lack of cooperation with UN efforts in Sudan, Ambassador Khalilzad convoked the P-5 to an October 30 meeting (ref A) and arranged an October 31 P-5 meeting with the SYG. Joining Ambassador Khalilzad, Ambassador Wolcott, and Deputy PolCouns at the meetings were UK PermRep Sawers, French DPR LaCroix, Chinese DPR Liu Zhenmin, and Russian PDPR Shcherbak and DPR Dolgov. At the October 31 session, Ban was joined by UnderSecretary for Peacekeeping Operations Guehenno and SYG Chief of Staff Nambiar.

P-5: Three Out of Five Isn't Enough

¶3. (C) At the October 30 session, Ambassador Khalilzad explained that an exasperated Ban had informed him that he was at his wits end about how to persuade Sudanese President Bashir to agree to the list of potential UNAMID troop contributing countries that has been sitting on his desk since September after being approved by both the UN and the AU. To Russian and Chinese suggestions that UNAMID deployment problems were essentially technical, the Ambassador countered that Khartoum's record of persistent obstruction and delay since UNSCR 1769 was adopted (July 31) demonstrates that Bashir "wants a force that is incapable and wants even that only later." He renewed a USG suggestion

that the P-5 jointly demarche Bashir in Khartoum.

¶4. (C) France and the UK readily agreed to the idea of a joint P-5 demarche, but Russia's Dolgov dismissed it, saying "working individually is better than working in a group because it avoids politicizing what is basically a technical matter." Dolgov assured the group that "our ambassador in Khartoum has just been instructed to go into the GNU at a high level to talk about UNAMID deployment." Agreeing with Russia that UNAMID deployment problems are practical in nature, China's Liu said "we can't just say to Khartoum that we've selected a force and you must accept it." He added that China is aware of Ban's complaints but insisted that China's special representative in Sudan "got a whole different story from Khartoum" that suggested that the UN-AU-GNU tri-partite process just needed to be activated to resolve these different perceptions with practical solutions.

Ambassador Khalilzad challenged Russia and China to show how repeating the same bilateral contacts can be expected to produce different results and urged the full P-5 to consider incrementally all our options "if we are serious about getting the job done," adding that insisting that these delays "are not political but only technical is not to be serious."

Ban to P-5: It's Your Resolution - Do Something  
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¶5. (SBU) All P-5 members having agreed to listen first-hand to Ban's concerns, a meeting with the SYG was scheduled for October 31. At that meeting, Ban described three tracks in the UN's engagement in Sudan -- peacekeeping, peace talks, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He said he understands that making progress on the peace talks was largely beyond GNU capacity because the rebels were not under

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its control, but he argued that progress on the peacekeeping and CPA tracks "just depends on how Bashir thinks. He can decide to make force composition happen tomorrow morning. What rationale is there to accept only China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan from Asia but reject Thailand and Nepal. There is no rationale behind (his decisions on) Sweden and the Nordic engineers." On CPA, Ban said "all problems rest with Bashir."

¶6. (SBU) Venting at length his exasperation with Bashir, Ban said, "I really wanted to have a personal relationship with him. I went there. He said 'no problem' on land and the rest. I hope some of you can give this message to him. Many informations leak from the United Nations -- the secretary-general reported in anger to the P-5 about Bashir.

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I spoke to (AUPSC Chair) Konare yesterday. I've spoken to more than a dozen African leaders, India, Europeans, Egypt -- who should have influence on him. Yesterday I also spoke to the South African representative and I have spoken to President Mbeki recently because Bashir is going there next week. I speak to all these people to try to make Bashir more practical and cooperative. I've really tried, but he is not listening. I am becoming personally angry and upset."

¶7. (C) Ban was especially direct with Chinese DPR Liu, saying "I think China should do something more." An awkward pause was finally broken by laughter, but Ban did not join in. UK's Sawers said "you have a right to be angry. We've gone to great lengths to achieve Security Council unanimity, but we (UK) fear Bashir wants to prevent an effective force in Darfur." Russia's Shcherbak replied "it is hard to separate deployment from the political process. We need more effort on the political process to secure the ground for a successful peacekeeping operation. We need to engage the splinter factions. It's risky to start operations without the political process off the ground."

¶18. (C) China's Liu agreed that Bashir "should be more flexible" and suggested that "we need to be more creative with him. But China prefers to have the secretary-general and his special envoys out front with Security Council members standing behind you. If the P-5 talks directly to Khartoum, they will take it as big power pressure rather than UN pressure and they will not respond. We should continue with UN talking and with we members standing behind and using bilateral channels to reinforce your message. We know we could play a role, and they will listen to us. But 60 years of dealing with African nations tells us to avoid pressuring them, to avoid criticizing them. We should show flexibility and try to resolve this at the technical level."

¶19. (C) Ban urged the P-5 and the Security Council to organize itself: to take advantage of the early November visit to New York of Sudan Vice President/Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir (to discuss CPA implementation); to do more about mobilizing resources for UNAMID (regarding helicopters in particular so that lack of mobility does not retard deployment); and to engage the GNU in a more constructive way (in particular by P-5 joint visits to African leaders and even to President Bashir). Ambassador Wolcott ended the meeting by emphasizing that, while a great deal of responsibility for hybrid deployment rests with the SYG and DPKO, 1769 is a Security Council creation and "it's up to us to implement it." She invited Ban to continue to regularly express his views and solicit P-5 help, individually and collectively, on Darfur.

¶10. (C) COMMENT. The new UN-led High Ranking Officer Technical Assessment Team (HROTAT), created especially to facilitate UNAMID deployment, leaves tonight (November 1) for Senegal, Mauritania, and Gambia on the first in a series of trips to evaluate troops offered for UNAMID deployment. Looking only slightly ahead on the deployment agenda, HROTAT evaluations can be expected to further complicate relations with Khartoum. Although all pressure should be brought to bear on Bashir to accept the list of troop contributing countries on his desk, that pressure should also anticipate that some troops on offer, especially from African countries, will likely prove substandard, at least at present, for lack of equipment, training, or force strength. Bashir needs to be made to accept that HROTAT rejection of some troops under these circumstances would not amount to UN backtracking on UNAMID African-centricity but rather would provide the quality control essential to deployment of a fully capable force. END COMMENT.  
Khalilzad